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1. Overview 
This report focuses on Agenda 2030 and the challenges of delivering the Global Goals and the 
implications of trends for the UK’s international development work. 
Section 2 focuses on the Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDGs/Global Goals) 
and the challenges of delivering them (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs). These 
Global Goals will shape the world’s approach to growth and sustainable development until 2030. 
Building on the progress made by the Millennium Development Goals, this agenda sets out the 
framework through which the world will work together to combat the most pressing challenges of 
our time. The goals are: 
Goal 1: No Poverty  
Goal 2: Zero Hunger  
Goal 3: Good Health  
Goal 4: Quality Education  
Goal 5: Gender Equality  
Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation  
Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy  
Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth  
Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure  
Goal 10: Reduced Inequalities  
Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities  
Goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production  
Goal 13: Climate Action  
Goal 14: Life Below Water  
Goal 15: Life on Land  
Goal 16: Peace and Justice  
Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals  
Section 2 also includes some evidence providing details of the goals and the progress in working 
towards them. It also details some evidence on accountability of the SDGs and the challenges in 
delivering them. There are also some basic videos explaining what the SDGs are.   
Section 3 focuses on implications of trends for the UK’s international development work, 
with a particular focus on development spending globally. This section includes information 
on the operating context for international development, ‘megatrends’ and drivers of change.  It 
also incorporates several government reports on aid spending and trends.  Since 2015, the UK 
has legally committed itself to spending 0.7 per cent of its gross national income on official 
development assistance (ODA) each year. Following the decision to leave the EU, government 
reports have emphasised that the UK will be even more engaged internationally. They state that 
the multilateral system is vital to the UK and global interests and they will continue to be a 
committed supporter of it. DFID’s multilateral partnerships expand the reach of UK development 
and mobilise tremendous resources and expertise to tackle global challenges.  
In addition to this, section 3 also covers global ODA trends and there is a specific section on aid 
spending in the United States as they are the biggest donor and there have been big changes in 
their development spending very recently. This section finishes with a section including some 
quick and easy to read blogs on recent aid spending trends globally. 
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2.  Towards 2030 and the challenges of delivering the 
Global Goals  
UK Government and the Global Goals  
DFID (2017) Agenda 2030 The UK Government’s approach to delivering the Global Goals 
for Sustainable Development - at home and around the world 
https://www.gov.uk/government/u ploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/603500/Agenda-
2030-Report4.pdf 
The 17 Global Goals for Sustainable Development (the Goals) will shape the world’s approach to 
growth and sustainable development until 2030 (Agenda 2030). Building on the progress made 
by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) between 2000 and 2015, this ambitious agenda 
sets out the framework through which the world will work together to combat the most pressing 
challenges of our time, including eradicating extreme poverty, ending hunger, protecting our 
environment and breaking down gender barriers. The Goals were agreed by 193 member states 
of the United Nations (UN) in September 2015 and apply to every country. This document 
provides an overview and examples of how the UK Government is contributing to the delivery of 
each of the Goals, it is a useful tool to gain a general understanding of what the UK Government 
is doing to deliver the Goals and the challenges they face to do this. 
As the examples in the report suggest, the UK Government is proud of its work to achieve the 
Goals at home and around the world. But it highlights that they cannot be complacent. The 
prospect that in a few short years we can end extreme global poverty, hunger and many other 
evils should motivate us all. For its part, the UK Government will continue doing all it can to 
deliver the Goals in partnership with all those who share their ambition to make the Goals a 
reality. 
Tritton, B (2017) Leaving the UK behind? A review of the UK government’s SDG approach 
Thinkpiece on the government paper 
http://deliver2030.org/?p=8228 
Perhaps the biggest critique of the government policy paper (above) by Tritton is the lack of 
detail provided. The overview and examples provided for each goal are linked to the indicators 
and targets for each goal but a member of public with little knowledge of the Global Goals would 
not know this. There is little information given about the annual timeline of the monitoring and 
review process up until 2020 (the next UK General Election at the time of writing) and how 
national monitoring and review processes will be linked to the UN follow up processes. 
It is not clear which departments will be addressing which goals, and how local governments will 
be involved in implementing and reporting of the goals beyond the involvement of devolved 
administration systems. A brief assessment of how Brexit will affect the UK’s approach to the 
Global Goals could have been provided even if a brief statement acknowledging the potential 
impact at the national and global levels. All in all, a brave first step towards commitment to global 
progress but if the gaps in policy paper are not addressed, the UK could be the one being left 
behind… 
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Measuring Progress 
OECD (2017) Measuring Distance to the SDG Targets: An assessment of where OECD 
countries stand  
http://www.oecd.org/std/OECD-Measuring-Distance-to-SDG-Targets.pdf 
This study of the distances from delivering the SDGs of selected OECD countries is designed to 
help governments as they consider developing national action plans, as well as to contribute to 
SDG mainstreaming across different OECD Directorates. It leverages the wealth of statistical 
data collected by OECD members and harmonised through OECD tools and processes. This 
booklet updates the Pilot Study, published by OECD in July 2016, by offering a wider set of 
indicators and more complete coverage of the Agenda 2030 targets, as well as a refined 
methodology for assessing distance to those targets. 
This Study uses the latest information on various indicators available in OECD databases to 
establish countries’ distances from individual targets, and presents results for a number of 
countries. These starting positions are measured in terms of the distance to be travelled by 2030. 
This requires setting end-values for the targets to be achieved by 2030. The Study uses a flexible 
approach to target setting, with appropriate consideration being given to values specified either in 
the Agenda 2030 or in other international commitments, but also using the current range of 
OECD performance indicators as a rating scale where no such benchmarks have been 
enunciated. 
Howard, J.; Lopez-Franco, E. and Wheeler, J. (2017) Using knowledge from the margins to 
meet the SDGs: the real data revolution, Participate Policy Briefing 3, Brighton: IDS 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13019 
As efforts to meet the SDGs gain momentum there is an increasing need to consider the 
inclusiveness of the data revolution. In order to ‘leave no one behind’ in development, knowledge 
from marginalised people is necessary and must be valued and recognised. Without this 
knowledge being embedded in data, the complex realities of people living in societies’ margins 
are made invisible, and data may reinforce exclusion and inequalities rather than challenge them. 
Knowledge generated and amplified through participatory research processes that promote 
learning and dialogue between citizens and duty-bearers can enhance accountability 
relationships and help solutions to difficult social issues emerge. This real data revolution can 
support inclusive strategies for meeting the global goals from the ground-up.  
López-Franco, E.; Howard, J. and Wheeler, J. (2017) Participatory Accountability for the 
SDGs: beyond Social Accountability, Participate Policy Briefing 4, Brighton: IDS 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13020 
People who are most marginalised need to participate in the monitoring and accountability of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) if the ‘leave no-one behind’ ambition is to be met. 
Participatory accountability is necessary for their realities to be understood and for their voices to 
be heard. This can be achieved through processes that both enable personal empowerment, 
collective identity building and knowledge of rights, and support interest in and capabilities for 
political engagement. Knowledge generated by people in the margins must complement 
statistical data in order to build a deeper understanding of the issues that perpetuate poverty and 
inequality and how to address them. People’s knowledge and collective action for accountability 
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needs to be joined with efforts by national governments, civil society organisations, the UN and 
other multilateral institutions. 
Howard, J., and Wheeler, J. (2015) "What community development and citizen 
participation should contribute to the new global framework for sustainable 
development." Community Development Journal 50.4: 552-570 
https://academic.oup.com/cdj/article-abstract/50/4/552/349373/What-community-development-
and-citizen?redirectedFrom=PDF 
In September 2015, the SDGs replaced the millennium development goals. The ambitions of the 
SDGs are to transform the current aid architecture and promote environmental, economic and 
social well-being on a global scale. The process of how this new global framework for 
sustainable development has been designed is unique in terms of the extent of opportunities for 
people's participation.  
This article considers what lessons the debate on community development can offer the new 
global development framework. First, they analyse existing attempts to include ‘voices’ from the 
local level in the process of formulating the SDGs, drawing on existing literature on critical 
community development and citizen participation. They find that the inclusion of citizen 
perspectives in the SDG process was largely tokenistic. Building on this critique, they go on to 
explore the propositions within the critical community development literature about an approach 
to implementing the SDGs that could be truly transformative. Finally, they consider the insights 
from the critical community development literature in relation to the findings of a global network of 
participatory research that aimed to influence the SDG design and implementation. They explore 
how citizen's participation in the new global framework could become more significant through 
deeper and more strategic forms of representation and engagement. In conclusion, they return to 
examine the prospects and practical requirements for a more bottom-up and transformative 
approach to implementing the new global framework. 
Challenges of delivering the Goals 
Spaiser, V, Ranganathan, S, Swain, R and Sumpter, D (2016)The sustainable development 
oxymoron: quantifying and modelling the incompatibility of sustainable development 
goals, International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504509.2016.1235624 
 
Critical voices such as the International Council for Science (ICSU) have expressed concerns 
about the potential incompatibility of the SDGs, specifically the incompatibility of socio-economic 
development and environmental sustainability. In this paper, the authors test, quantify and model 
the alleged inconsistency of SDGs. Their analyses show which SDGs are consistent and which 
are conflicting. They measure the extent of inconsistency and conclude that the SDG agenda will 
fail as a whole if business as usual is continued. They look at the nature of the inconsistencies 
using dynamical systems models, which reveal that the focus on economic growth and 
consumption as a means for development underlies the inconsistency. Their models also show 
that there are factors which can contribute to development (health programmes, government 
investment) on the one hand and ecological sustainability (renewable energy) on the other, 
without triggering the conflict between incompatible SDGs. 
 
OECD (2015) Governance challenges and suggested tools for the implementation of the 
water-related Sustainable Development Goals 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/pdf/Governance_O
ECD_Tool_paper_final.pdf 
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In practice, governments face 7 categories of governance gaps when it comes to managing 
water. These gaps should not be considered in isolation as they can mutually reinforce each 
other, and can be more or less acute from one country to another.  
1. Administrative Gap. Water cuts across administrative boundaries, be it local, provincial 
or even national. 
2. Policy Gap. Water-related tasks are fragmented across authorities and levels of 
government which raises the question of vertical and horizontal coordination for effective 
implementation of a water SDG. A whole of government approach that goes beyond 
“silos” is needed not to jeopardise the implementation of the water SDG.  
3. Information Gap. Information is power. Though progress has been made in terms of 
hydrological data and water information systems have spread across the globe, much 
remains to be done in terms of socio-economic and financial data to guide decision-
making in the water sector.  
4. Capacity Gap. Capacity in terms of human resources, expertise and infrastructure 
remains a major challenge.  
5. Funding gap. Increasing the number of people with safe access to drinking water and 
sanitation and meeting more and more stringent environmental regulations will require 
financial resources. Three ultimate sources of revenues exist in the sector: taxes, tariffs 
and transfers from international development. The share of these is a political choice, 
taking into account issues of economic efficiency, social equity, environmental 
sustainability and affordability constraints.  
6. Objective gap. The multiplicity of stakeholders in the water sector makes it vulnerable to 
lobbying, and risks of capture which can freeze decision-making. If a water SDG can 
certainly be conceived as a universal, aspirational goal, its effective implementation will 
require managing a number of trade-offs between diverging objectives, interests and 
priorities.  
7. Accountability gap. Many countries are going through a crisis of trust in their 
governments. The Arab spring has been an emblematic example in the last few years. 
Often, the capacity of governments to deliver quality public services at an affordable cost 
is an indicator of accountability vis-à-vis citizens. Issues of transparency and integrity are 
also important in a sector that has a high degree of monopolistic behaviour.  
 
Implementing a water SDG will require an enabling and regulatory environment that allows 
monitoring and assessing progress in a transparent and inclusive way. Engaging all stakeholders 
at different levels from information to partnerships or co-decision according to the needs, also 
stands as a prerequisite for effective buy-in and accountability. 
 
Van de Pas, R., Hill, P. S., Hammonds, R., Ooms, G., Forman, L., Waris, A., Brolan, C. E., 
McKee, M., and Sridhar, D. (2017) Global health governance in the sustainable 
development goals: Is it grounded in the right to health?. Global Challenges, 1: 47–60. doi: 
10.1002/gch2.1022. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/gch2.1022/full 
The paper discusses definitions of global health governance and whether the SDGs are 
grounded in the right to health. The experience of the MDGs is that, once accepted, the goals 
and their targets are relatively fixed. Despite their significant contribution to the Global Burden of 
Disease (Murray et al., 2013), the non-communicable diseases (NCDs) were marginalised for the 
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15 years of the MDGs. Although NCDs are now included in the SDGs, it is to be seen whether 
they will receive the prominence and attention deserved. The NCD challenge does not only 
require funding or new financing mechanism, but also global regulation to address the key 
vectors of the epidemic, such as the overconsumption of sugars, tobacco, and alcohol. The 
global governance structures as part of the sustainable development agenda are poorly suited to 
deal with this multisectoral issue (Sridhar et al., 2013).  
The SDGs may provide for the progressive realisation envisaged in the right to health, but 
experience from the MDGs suggests the SDG indicators currently under development will 
determine the priorities for implementation, and as with the MDGs, will form the hubs around 
which governance structures will coalesce. In terms of ensuring support for the minimum core 
obligations and prioritizing the marginalised and vulnerable, this comes with some risks. 
The central question for this paper was: does the SDG agenda overcome that gap? Does the 
SDG agenda entail new or improved global health governance that satisfies the demands of the 
Right to Health? The answer is, unfortunately, negative. In each of the four functions of global 
health governance (according to Frenk and Moon), the SDG health agenda undercuts the Right 
to Health. Firstly; the stewardship function of global health governance is not addressed in the 
SDGs. Secondly; the GPGH that are included in the SDGs are insufficient. Beyond domestic 
legislation, there is no clear allocation of the responsibility to produce those global public goods. 
Thirdly; the mobilization of global solidarity merely includes the long-existing promise of High-
Income Countries to spend 0.7% of their Gross National Income on Official Development 
Assistance complemented by a shifting focus on trade investments and domestic financing. 
Lastly; the management of externalities that impact on health is hardly considered in the SDGs. 
All in all, the SDG agenda does not alter let alone improve global health governance. 
Finally, legal scholars have suggested that current representations of the right to health in the 
SDGs are insufficient and superficial, because they do not explicitly link SDG commitments or 
right to health discourse to binding treaty obligations for duty-bearing nation states or 
entitlements by people, whether legal citizens or undocumented. If global health policy is to 
meaningfully contribute to the realisation of the right to health and to rights based global health 
governance then future iterations of global health policy must bridge this gap. 
 
Jolly, R (2014) Goals for the future – challenges for the UK and the rest of Europe 
http://unohrlls.org/custom-content/uploads/2014/12/Global-Development-Goals-2014.pdf 
This was written in 2014 but some aspects may still be useful. The post-2015 development 
agenda needs to be bold and transformational if the world is to succeed in eradicating poverty in 
all its dimensions and in achieving sustainable development. The next global agenda must 
therefore not only complete the unfinished business of the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), but also go further to ensure that no one is left behind. Current proposals envisage a 
world free of extreme poverty, where no child is out of school, and no one is hungry or 
malnourished. There is broad agreement that it should be a universal agenda, promoting 
sustainable development which delivers economic and social progress within nature’s 
boundaries. 
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Clark, H (2017) Keynote Speech on Improved Global Governance to meet our 
Shared Challenges 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2017/02/13/helen-clark-
keynote-speech-on-improved-global-governance-to-meet-our-shared-challenges-at-the-high-
level-session-of-the-5th-world-government-summit.html 
 
The magnitude of the challenges our world faces needs to lead us to reinvigorate the multilateral 
institutions which were established to solve our shared problems. 
 
This is happening to a certain extent in the economic and financial arena, and around 
sustainable development and governance of the global commons. While development agendas 
have moral, not legal force, it is encouraging to see so many countries volunteering to be early 
presenters of national progress reports on the Sustainable Development Goals. Those reports 
come to the purpose-designed High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
convened under the auspices of the UN’s Economic and Social Council – this reform has 
breathed new life into the role and relevance of ECOSOC and is a welcome sign of willingness to 
change. As well, the speedy coming into force of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
suggests that there is a broad will to see global governance succeed in that area. 
 
The human rights pillar of the UN has also broken new ground since the formation of the Human 
Rights Council in 2006 and the establishment of its Universal Periodic Review Mechanism. All 
Member States are expected to present national reports on the status of human rights in their 
country, and to respond to the recommendations made by the Human Rights Council. I have no 
doubt that this helps promote broader adherence to human rights. Nonetheless, from shrinking 
civic space to repression of freedom of speech and all the way through to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, there are many assaults on human rights these days. The need to uphold 
human dignity is an urgent an imperative as it ever was. 
 
While effective global governance in the peace and security realm is struggling, among other 
things from an inability to update key provisions of the UN’s Charter drafted in 1945, that should 
not stop Member States moving ahead with progressive agendas for addressing the root causes 
of conflict and using all available mechanisms to build and sustain peace. The 2030 Agenda 
boldly asserts that there can be no sustainable development without peace, and no peace 
without sustainable development. Success in implementing the 2030 Agenda will have long term 
benefits for people and planet, peace and security, and for the legitimacy and credibility of the 
multilateral system. 
 
Informative Videos on the SDGs 
How We Can Make the World a Better Place by 2030, Michael Green, TED Talks 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o08ykAqLOxk 
 
UN video on the SDGs 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/01/the-sustainable-development-summit-
building-the-2030-agenda/ 
 
The SDGs- Action Towards 2030, CAFOD 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-xdy1Jr2eg 
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Hans Rosling talking to the US State Department about Development Myths  
https://www.ted.com/talks/hans_rosling_at_state 
3. Implications of trends for the UK’s international 
development work 
UK Development Spending  
Lunn, J (2016) The 2016 Bilateral and Multilateral Development Reviews, House of 
Commons Library, Number 7828, 8 December 2016 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7828#fullreport 
After several delays, the 2016 Bilateral Development Review (BDR) and Multilateral 
Development Review (MDR) were published by the UK Government on 1 December 2016, 
superseding the 2011 Reviews published by the previous Coalition Government. In doing so, the 
word ‘aid’ in the title of the 2011 Reviews was deliberately replaced by ‘development’. The 2016 
Reviews follow on from the publication in November 2015 of a new aid strategy, UK aid: tackling 
global challenges in the national interest. The 2011 Reviews were an important moment in the 
articulation of the last Government’s aid policy for that Parliament – the moment when 
overarching principles and approaches were translated into specific country programmes and 
decisions on whether or not to support particular multilateral organisations over the next five 
years. While the 2016 MDR performs a broadly comparable role to that performed by its 
predecessor, the 2016 BDR does not. Most notably, unlike the 2011 Bilateral Review it contains 
no information about future funding allocations by country through to 2020/21. Nor does it 
provide information about agreed results by country over the same period. The delays in 
publication and the absence of this information in the BDR mean that a gap in public knowledge 
of DFID’s planning frameworks has arguably emerged. There have also been no updated 
versions of DFID’s country ‘operational plans’ published since December 2014. It is not clear 
from the BDR whether these plans will now be updated and if so, when. This briefing may be 
updated in future if future developments warrant it. 
DFID (2016) Raising the standard: the Multilateral Development Review 2016 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573884/Multilateral
-Development-Review-Dec2016.pdf 
Key messages 
• Following the decision to leave the EU, the UK will be even more engaged internationally. 
The multilateral system is vital to the UK and global interests and the Government will 
continue to be a committed supporter of it.  
• DFID’s multilateral partnerships expand the reach of UK development and mobilise 
tremendous resources and expertise to tackle global challenges. The UK’s significant 
relationships with leading multilaterals help ensure Britain stands tall in the world.  
• The MDR systematically assessed the performance of 38 multilateral institutions that the 
UK funds through DFID.  
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• DFID rigorously assessed results and value for money, risk and assurance, transparency 
and accountability. They asked whether agencies were still relevant for meeting today’s 
most urgent challenges.  
• This Review set higher standards than the previous Multilateral Aid Review in 2011. The 
UK is raising the bar, requiring more from their partners by following the money, the 
people and the outcomes.  
• Most of the international system is performing well. The UK’s multilateral partners ensure 
that UK development reaches more people, saves more lives and lifts more countries out 
of poverty.  
• Organisations including the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
(the Global Fund) and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, are achieving exceptional results. The 
UK will continue to give these agencies strong support, while pressing for even higher 
standards.  
• By working closely with partners across the multilateral system, they have in recent years 
seen encouraging improvements in delivery at some agencies, including the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation and International Organisation for Migration.  
• Many other organisations are doing a good job, but could do even better. DFID will work 
closely with them, and with other countries, to raise their performance. They will link up to 
30% of their funding to UN development and humanitarian organisations to improve 
results.  
• A small number of organisations are under-performing, and they are taking immediate 
action to address this.  
• The Review found that the multilateral system as a whole is falling short of its 
considerable potential because agencies, and the wider UN family, are not working 
together. The UK will work with partners to ensure there is less competition and 
duplication between organisations, and more collaboration and coordination instead.  
• Across all multilaterals, the UK will push for improved transparency, better value for 
money and greater accountability. As part of this Review, DFID is setting out more 
requirements for multilateral agencies, including new openness about management and 
administration budgets. By opening up the books, they will empower people around the 
world to hold these powerful institutions to account and introduce a clear incentive for 
them to deliver value for the world’s poorest people. 
 
Bond (2015) Fast Forward: The Changing Role of UK based INGOs 
https://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/reports/Fast_Forward_0515.pdf 
In a rapidly changing global context, all who act in the name of international development must 
regularly ask themselves: Are we doing the right thing? Are we needed? Are we doing the best 
we can do with the resources we have? Is the way we work enhancing progress to a better, more 
just world for all? These questions of purpose, value and utility are particularly pertinent in 2015, 
at a time of major shifts in the international operating environment. The paper that follows is the 
fruit of a concentrated process initiated in February 2015. Bond convened views from its diverse 
membership of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and from other 
development actors in order to share ideas about civil society over the next ten years. Together 
they asked the question: What will be needed from UK-based INGOs and donors to respond to 
changing needs in this new world? 
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With the International Development Act (2015), although the UK’s aid budget has been ring-
fenced, its aid agency has not. DFID is currently rated “very good” by independent experts on 
transparency and its peers value its leadership in driving the development agenda making it a 
best-in-class development aid agency. However, gains of the past are under threat from staff 
cuts and the need to minimise transaction costs. At the same time, the public, parliament and the 
independent aid commission are all keen to scrutinise value for money in the UK’s development 
aid budget. This should be seen as a shared challenge for both DFID and UK-based INGOs, and 
they must work together to address it. 
Profound change is required if a new partnership between DFID and UK-based INGOs is to 
emerge. However, a “burning platform” created by abrupt changes to the funding environment 
may create other problems for UK-based INGOs and those they serve that could be avoided by a 
carefully staged approach to evolutionary change. The changes anticipated over the next decade 
pose considerable challenges for all who seek a fairer world through development.  
DFID (2016) Statistics on International Development 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/572063/statistics-
on-international-development-2016a.pdf 
 
Statistics on International Development (SID) is an annual publication that provides an overview 
of official UK spend1 on international development. The publication is the release of finalised 
2015 estimates, updating the previous provisional estimates published in April 2016, found here. 
The publication covers:  
 
• Total UK spend on international development for the 2015 calendar year;  
• Trends for the last five years;  
• Key breakdowns by recipient country or organisation, type of assistance and purpose;  
• International comparisons of spend on international development.  
 
Manji, A. and Mandler, P. (2017) Budget wheeze could be double whammy for aid and 
research. Times Higher Education  
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/budget-wheeze-could-be-double-whammy-for-
aid-and-research 
 
Since 2015, the UK has legally committed itself to spending 0.7 per cent of its gross national 
income on official development assistance (ODA) each year – amounting to more than £12 billion 
in 2015-16. Until 2015, most of the aid budget was spent directly by DFID on poverty reduction in 
specified countries, as is required for its international recognition as ODA, with only small 
amounts of expenditure through other departments on obviously related efforts, such as research 
supporting disease eradication. 
 
In 2015, however, a new “whole of government” approach to ODA was announced, by which it 
would be disbursed through a much wider range of agencies. For academic research, the most 
significant novelty was the creation of the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), amounting 
to more than £1 billion over five years, designed “to support cutting-edge research that 
addresses the challenges faced by developing countries”. Part of the GCRF is “allocated” to 
specific research councils and academies as part of their ring-fenced budgets, but part is 
“unallocated” and appears to be “new money”, for which research councils and academies can 
angle. Such new money is highly unusual in this age of austerity and helps to explain the bullish 
response of many funding bodies to the announcement of the fund. 
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But the “allocated” part of the GCRF is being double-counted as both ODA and as part of the 
research budget. And even those strongly in favour of both development assistance and 
academic research, as we are, might still have doubts about combining the two – particularly as 
quickly and as loosely as the government appears to be doing. It may not be good for 
development, and it may not be good for research. 
 
Manji, A. (2016) The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) 
Act 2015: legislative spending targets, poverty alleviation and aid scrutiny. Modern Law 
Review 79(4), pp. 655-677 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-
2230.12204/abstract;jsessionid=88F8664B166616EC9C9C57D2157FD71F.f03t02 
With the enactment of the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) 
Act 2015, the UK became the first member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to enshrine an aid target in law. It is now under a legal duty to spend 0.7% 
of Gross National Income (GNI) on aid every year. This paper has two aims. Firstly, it assesses 
the implications of enshrining a spending target for development assistance in law. It connects 
this to recent moves to set targets for specific areas of spending more generally. The UK’s 
decision to adopt a legal spending target for aid is important because other donors are likely to 
follow its lead. Secondly, this paper argues that commentators have focused their analyses too 
narrowly on the legal target (section 1) and that it is in fact the mechanisms for scrutinising 
development assistance contained in section 5 of the new Act that will be important in future. 
This is because judicial scrutiny of aid spending is a remote possibility as a result of the 
International Development Act 2002, introduced in response to the Pergau Dam case. The paper 
provides an analysis of the new legislation in the context of the UK’s now detailed legislative 
framework for international development aid and concludes that this framework is far from 
satisfactory. 
House of Commons International Development Committee (2015) The Future of UK 
Development Cooperation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid: Government Response to the 
Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2014–15 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmintdev/339/339.pdf 
 
Government response to the International Development Committee report on the second phase 
of the inquiry on Future of UK Development Cooperation: Beyond Aid. 
 
The Guardian (2016) Less aid money, less influence: Brexit's likely hit to the UK's 
development role 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/07/brexit-uk-development-role-less-
aid-money-less-influence 
 
Despite the many imponderables transfixing domestic politics, it already seems clear that Brexit 
will have a mainly detrimental effect on Britain’s international role, certainly in the short term. The 
UK is likely to have less aid money and less influence, while the success of the leave campaign 
could also signal a more inward-looking agenda. 
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International Development Trends 
Bond (2015) Tomorrow’s World: How might megatrends in development affect the future 
roles of UK-based INGOs?  
https://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/publications/Tomorrows_World_230215.pdf 
This discussion paper provides an overview of the main factors that are likely to inform how the 
world changes over the next decade to 2025. In it Bond identify seven ‘megatrends’ and consider 
their implications for civil society and the operating context within which international 
development NGOs work. Finally they identify some key roles that UK-based INGOs can play, 
which are distinctive, needed and relevant in contributing to addressing development goals. This 
paper provides a starting point for a broad discussion among the Bond membership about the 
future roles of UK-based INGOs and the way in which their work is supported by the UK 
government.  
Megatrends and drivers of change  
• Climate change and planetary boundaries  
• Demographic shifts  
• Urbanisation  
• Resource scarcity  
• Geopolitical shifts  
• Technology and innovation  
• Poverty and inequality  
 
The operating context for international development  
• Disasters, displacement and humanitarian crisis  
• Change spaces, agents of change  
• Identity, values, trust and integrity 
• The future of development assistance  
• Beyond aid.... 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2014) Reimagine your future: megatrends and international 
development 
https://www.pwc.co.uk/government-public-sector/assets/reimagine-your-future-megatrends-and-
international-development.pdf# 
The megatrends are already re-shaping the international development landscape today, and will 
continue to do so over the next few decades. So how should donors adapt, and what will success 
look like in 2025? While there are many possibilities, it’s clear that new thinking and new delivery 
models are needed. ‘Business as usual’ will not be an option - donors will have to step out of 
their comfort zone, and the scale of interaction with the private sector and new donors will need 
to increase. With new donors placing less of an emphasis on conditionality, accountability and 
transparency, traditional donors will need to decide whether, and how far, they are prepared to 
compromise. For example, with transparency being such a strong focus for traditional donors 
(through the International Aid Transparency Initiative, open data and other sources), what will a 
model of cooperation on transparency between traditional and new donors actually look like? The 
role of donors could even change in the near future - some may shift more to a venture capital 
model, funding game-changing innovations for development.  
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As the scale and emphasis of the private sector increases in international development (driven 
by the search for new markets and sustainability as a core metric), donors may be better placed 
to select new ideas with the most potential for overcoming development challenges, rather than 
simply delivering programmes on the ground. We may see a growing differentiation between 
‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’ – with some donors seeing innovation as a larger part of their core business 
than others, and moving more quickly to react. Donors are already starting to rethink their 
purpose and role in society, but this should be expedited for those who want to continue making 
an impact. Perhaps donors could take a zero-based approach to their business, not just their 
budgeting – asking themselves: what would really happen if they didn’t exist? Some donors may 
become less relevant over the next few decades and it may make sense to merge with others 
with similar objectives. The World Bank is already undergoing a process of reform, as many of its 
clients graduate from the low- to middle-income categories in the near future, forcing it to rethink 
how it delivers programmes. Whatever the outcome, donors will need to be agile and have a firm 
eye on global changes in order to remain successful 
Green, D. (2015) Fit for the Future? Development trends and the role of international NGOs 
http://www.globaltfokus.dk/images/Kapacitetsudvikling/Arrangementer_kap_forum/dp-fit-for-
future-INGOs-110615-Oxfam-en.pdf  
 
This short paper summarises the main global trends in international development, before 
exploring two pressing questions: how is our own understanding of development changing, and 
what are the implications of these changes, whether practical or conceptual, for the future role of 
international non-government organisations?  
 
It highlights the folly of simple, linear interventions and the merits of alternative approaches such 
as bringing together stakeholders to find joint solutions (convening and brokering), or rapid 
iteration based on fast feedback and adaptation. 
  
Bond’s development predications for 2017 
https://www.bond.org.uk/development-predictions-for-2017 
https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2017/01/2016-development-predictions-how-did-we-do 
 
Predicting the future is tricky. Bond's panel of future thinkers have courageously penned what 
they think the key trends, themes and issues will be for international development in 2017.  
Find out what you should keep an eye on this year below, from how data will impact on 
organisations through to what the Unconditional Basic Income might mean for the development 
sector. 
 
Hailey, J. (2016) Global Trends and Challenges: Strategic Implications for NGOs, Paper 
Presented at ISTR Conference, Stockholm, July 2016 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.istr.org/resource/resmgr/WP_Stockholm/Cass_Global_Trends.pdf 
Interest in the implications of changing global trends have generated a number of recent studies 
drawing on current data to make “state of the world” projections and identify potential “mega-
trends” and “game changing trends”. Examples include reports by the National Intelligence 
Council (2012), the Oxford Martin Commission (2013) and the World Economic Forum (2013) 
examining potential global trends 2030 and beyond. Such reports highlight such common areas 
of concern as: the consequences of climate change, the impact of resource insecurity, 
demographic shifts, issues around social mobility and migration, the implications of growing 
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economic inequalities, increased social activism and role of civil society, changing geopolitical 
dynamics, the impact of new technologies and greater interconnectivity through the web. Similar 
analysis has been published reviewing the specific issues about the future of aid and the new 
“aid architecture” (Baobob, 2015; BOND, 2016, Heiner, 2014; Hailey, 2016: ICAI, 2016; Kharas & 
Rogerson, 2012); new development practices (Wild, 2015; IDS, 2013) and the future of different 
development institutions (BOND, 2015: Edwards, 2014; Gnarig, 2015; ICSC, 2014; Crowley & 
Ryan, 2013). The conclusion of such analysis is that needs are changing, problems are 
changing, solutions are changing, funding is changing, thinking is changing. As a consequence 
the established models are no longer appropriate for the new future. There is also concern at the 
speed of change or rapid onset of devastating humanitarian crisis – whether it is an earthquake 
as in Haiti or Nepal, or the unexpected and dramatic consequences of the civil war in Syria. 
INGO often refer to Dornbusch’s Law that “crises take much longer to come than you think, and 
happen much faster than you would have thought” 
National Audit Office (2015) Trends in total UK Official Development Assistance and the 
Department for International Development’s expenditure, Memorandum for the House of 
Commons International Development Committee 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Trends-in-total-UK-Official-Development-
Assistance-and-the-Department-for-International-Developments-expenditu.pdf 
The International Development Committee (the Committee) is considering the resource allocation 
processes used by the Department for International Development (DFID). This memorandum 
provides an overview of trends in spending on aid. It is in 7 parts. It has been designed to 
complement a note by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact on DFID’s approach to 
resource allocation. This memorandum draws on, and updates, recent work for the Committee, in 
particular their Short Guide to DFID, and the Comptroller and Auditor General's report on DFID’s 
management of the Official Development Assistance target. This memorandum uses Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) data published each year by DFID, most recently in December 
2015 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) Emerging donors – opportunities for new partnerships 
in international development 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/government-public-sector/international-
development/insights/emerging-donors-opportunities-for-new-partnerships-in-international-
development.html 
The international development landscape has become an increasingly large, diverse and 
complex marketplace, with a proliferation of non-governmental organisations, large-scale 
philanthropic initiatives and the steady rise of the so called ‘emerging donors’ or ‘new 
development partnerships’. This Soundbite draws attention to the benefits of being an aid 
partner, the comparative advantage of the new players in the development landscape, and 
outlines some of the opportunities they bring. 
ODA Spending Trends 
OECD aid calculations  
https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm#indicator-chart 
ODA is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Aid may be 
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provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development 
agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes grants, "soft" loans (where 
the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of technical assistance. The 
OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories; only aid to these countries counts 
as ODA. The list is periodically updated and currently contains over 150 countries or territories 
with per capita incomes below USD 12 276 in 2010. A long-standing United Nations target is that 
developed countries should devote 0.7% of their gross national income to ODA. This indicator is 
measured as a percentage of gross national income and million USD constant prices, using 2014 
as the base year. 
OECD (2017) Development aid rises again in 2016 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ODA-
2016-detailed-summary.pdf 
In 2016, net ODA flows from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD reached a new peak at USD 142.6 billion. This represented an increase of 
8.9% compared to 2015, when adjusting for exchange rates and inflation. Net ODA also rose as 
a share of gross national income (GNI) to 0.32. Net ODA continues to grow and its volume in real 
terms has doubled since 2000. Part of the increase in 2016 was due to higher costs for in-donor 
refugees, however, if these are excluded, ODA still grew by 7.1% in real terms.  
Between 2015 and 2016, ODA for in-donor refugee costs rose by 27.5% in real terms, from USD 
12.1 billion to USD 15.4 billion and its share of total net ODA increased from 9.2% to 10.8%. In 
2016, in-donor refugee costs represented more than 10% of total net ODA flows for eleven DAC 
countries, and for 4 of these, it was over 20%. In the last two years, many DAC members have 
faced unprecedented inflows of refugees and migrants. The DAC is examining how to best 
deliver whole-of-government approaches, so as to preserve aid budgets, as well as improve the 
consistency, comparability and transparency of ODA reporting of these costs.  
Within total net ODA, contributions by DAC countries to multilateral organisations rose by nearly 
10% in real terms. The volume of support for bilateral projects, programmes and technical 
cooperation rose slightly by nearly 3% in 2016, yet its share of total net ODA has fallen from 58% 
on average during the period from 2010 to 2012 to 49% in 2016. Net debt relief grants were USD 
2.5 billion in 2016, up from USD 431 million in 2015, due to exceptional debt relief for Cuba.  
Humanitarian aid rose by 8% to USD 14.4 billion. In terms of financial instruments, bilateral 
grants provided by DAC member countries rose by 9% in real terms from 2015. Excluding aid for 
in-donor refugees, they rose by 6%. By contrast, loans extended to developing countries fell 
slightly by 2% in real terms; net loans fell by 4% in real terms. Preliminary data show that 
bilateral net ODA to the group of least developed countries was USD 24 billion in 2016, and 
represented a fall of 3.9% in real terms compared to 2015. 
The data indicate that bilateral aid to Africa also fell slightly. Net ODA to Africa was USD 27 
billion in 2016 of which USD 24 billion was for sub-Saharan Africa, representing falls in real terms 
of 0.5% for Africa and 0.7% for sub-Saharan Africa. 
This report also includes the change in development spending by country. The largest DAC 
donors by volume were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and France. 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom met or exceeded the United 
Nations’ ODA target of 0.7% of GNI and Germany reached this target for the first time in 2016. 
The Netherlands’ ODA/GNI ratio slipped below 0.7% for the third time since 1974. 
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OECD (2015), Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235212-en 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/multilateral-aid-2015-9789264235212-en.htm 
This 2015 OECD report on multilateral aid contributes to the broader debate on how to 
implement the post-2015 development agenda. It argues that multilateral organisations have a 
fundamental role to play to forge and strengthen inclusive partnerships that will provide the 
collective, cross-border solutions needed to eradicate absolute poverty and foster a new era of 
economic progress, environmental sustainability, and peaceful and inclusive societies. But to be 
fit for purpose, multilateral organisations will need to implement a challenging reform agenda to 
both address the unfinished business of internal changes and respond to a fast-changing global 
environment. 
Multilateral Aid 2015 identifies how bilateral providers can support multilateral organisations in 
implementing the necessary changes and fostering effective partnerships that (i) make best use 
of all resources available for development, including earmarked funding, and (ii) leverage 
knowledge and resources from partners beyond the “traditional donors”. 
The multilateral system has stood the test of time. Over the past fifty years it has proven to be 
resilient and responsive to changing development dynamics and urgent needs, a major source of 
development expertise and know-how, and a powerful channel for intermediating and allocating 
resources. As the international community stands on the brink of the post-2015 era, the future 
role to be played by multilateral organisations could be even more important. Achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals’ transformative vision will call for inclusive partnerships that will 
provide collective, cross-border solutions for eradicating absolute poverty and fostering a new 
era of economic and social progress, environmental sustainability and peaceful and inclusive 
societies. The multilateral system at large – global, regional, traditional and new – is uniquely 
equipped to support this agenda. Multilateral organisations are politically neutral conveners of 
global partnerships, vehicles for upstream pooling of resources, facilitators for multi-stakeholder 
cross-border operations, and setters of global standards and norms. Further thinking about how 
to improve the functional features of the interactive relationship between providers, shareholders 
and the institutions themselves will be necessary.  
This fifth OECD report on multilateral aid aims to inform these global reflections. It comes at a 
crucial time, contributing to broader discussions on the implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals and suggesting recommendations for more effective multilateral partnerships 
in the post-2015 era. It provides a comprehensive baseline of data and analysis regarding the 
volume and nature of resources provided DAC members and providers beyond the DAC to 
support the activities of leading multilateral organisations. It assesses the state of play regarding 
the policies, funding mechanisms and interactions of provider countries vis-à-vis these 
institutions – and implications for their efficiency and effectiveness. It also provides an essential 
stocktake on how multilateral organisations themselves are gearing up for the post-2015 era. 
Recent changes in American development policy and spending and 
the implications for UK development work: 
Michael Kaczmarek with Graham Scott, US Development Policy: New Priorities Under 
President Trump, 11th July 2017, European Parliament Briefing 
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608639/EPRS_BRI(2017)608639
_EN.pdf 
The new administration of US President Donald Trump has put forward an 'America First' vision 
in the field of development policy. In his 2018 budget proposal, President Trump requests the US 
Congress to scale back and refocus US political commitments and financial contributions in the 
areas of economic and development assistance, humanitarian aid and global health. Limited US 
foreign assistance funding will be prioritised on the regions, programmes and international 
organisations that most directly advance US national security and economic interests. The US 
reasoning is that other countries, other donors and the private sector will fill the resulting 
development policy gaps, through paying 'their fair share'. In line with his scepticism of 
multilateral agreements and international organisations, President Trump announced on 1 June 
2017 that the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. While the withdrawal will 
potentially take years, the USA will immediately cease contributions to the Green Climate Fund, 
which was not just established to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing 
countries, but also to help vulnerable societies adapt to the impacts of climate change. 
The President’s FY2018 budget proposal includes US$37.6 billion for the US Department of 
State (State) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) – a 32 % reduction 
compared to FY2017 appropriations. EPRS US development policy EPRS – European 
Parliament Liaison Office, Washington DC Page 3 of 8 For humanitarian assistance, the 2018 
budget proposal requests US$5.3 billion, a US$2.4 billion reduction (-31 %) and for global health 
US$6.5 billion, a US$2.2 billion reduction (-25 %). The request for contributions to international 
organisations is US$996 million, a decrease of US$447 million (-31 %). US contributions for 
international peacekeeping activities are reduced from US$2.4 billion to US$1.2 billion (-50 %). 
Under the proposed budget, the USA will focus its support on countries that are of current 
national security interest, located mainly in the Middle East and in Africa's Sahel region. Bilateral 
aid programmes for dozens of other developing countries are reduced to nothing or substantially 
cut. Funds for regional aid programmes and multilateral development banks are likewise 
eliminated or reduced. 
The President’s 2018 budget calls to reduce the US contributions to the United Nations (UN) and 
other international organisations from US$1.44 billion to US$996 million. It proposes to end or 
reduce funding for international programmes and organisations 'whose missions do not 
substantially advance US foreign policy interests or for which the funding burden is not fairly 
shared amongst members'. Priority will be given to organisations that most directly support US 
national security interests and American prosperity. NATO, for instance, would continue to be 
fully funded. 
Christopher Grollman, Leonardo Arregoces, Melisa Martínez-Álvarez, Catherine Pitt, Anne 
Mills, Josephine Borghi, (2017) 11 years of tracking aid to reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health: estimates and analysis for 2003–13 from the Countdown to 
2015, The Lancet Global Health, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages e104-e114, ISSN 2214-109X, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(16)30304-7. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214109X16303047 
Tracking aid flows helps to hold donors accountable and to compare the allocation of resources 
in relation to health need. With the use of data reported by donors in 2015, we provided 
estimates of official development assistance and grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
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Foundation (collectively termed ODA+) to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health for 
2013 and complete trends in reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health support for the 
period 2003–13. 
The increase in reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health funding over the period 2003–
13 is encouraging. Further increases in funding will be needed to accelerate maternal mortality 
reduction while keeping a high level of investment in sexual and reproductive health and in child 
health. 
Jerome A Singh, Salim S Abdool Karim, (2017) Trump's “global gag rule”: implications for 
human rights and global health, The Lancet Global Health, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages e387-
e389, ISSN 2214-109X, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(17)30084-0. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214109X17300840 
President Trump, has, through an executive order in his fourth day in office, reinstated a Reagan-
era prohibition on the disbursement of federal funding to non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and agencies that provide, promote, or make referrals to abortion services, or give 
information about abortions. Introduced by President Ronald Reagan in August, 1984, at the 
International Conference on Population, in Mexico City, the “Mexico City Policy” or “global gag 
rule”, as it has become popularly known, was rescinded by President Bill Clinton in 1993, 
resurrected by President George W Bush in 2002, and rescinded by President Barack Obama in 
2009.7 The enforcement of the policy has affected major international agencies such as the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which lost over $244 million in US federal funding 
during the George W Bush era.  
This executive order could have great human rights and ethics implications. South Africa is an 
example of a country that stands to be adversely affected. The country bears the world's largest 
burden of HIV and is a major recipient of US federal funding. The country's constitution enshrines 
the right to reproductive decision-making and the right to health, while its laws on termination of 
pregnancy places a legal obligation on health-care providers to provide or refer abortion-seekers 
to relevant facilities, when qualifying criteria are met. Compliance with Trump's order will 
potentially require clinicians in NGOs and international agencies that operate in South Africa and 
receive US federal funding to violate their professional codes of ethics,13 the country's abortion 
laws, and the country's bill of rights. 
The Guardian (2017) UK fails to contribute as donors unite to bridge US 'global gag' 
funding shortfall 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/02/uk-donors-unite-us-global-
gag-rule-shortfall-trump-she-decides-conference-brussels 
The British government failed to join other donors in pledging millions of dollars to an 
international fund aimed at filling the gap left by Donald Trump’s reimposition of the “global gag 
rule”. 
At a conference in Brussels on Thursday attended by delegates from 50 countries, pledges were 
made totalling €181m (£155m) to fund family planning and reproductive health services in low-
income countries. Organisers hope to counter Trump’s ban on US aid to overseas groups that 
provide abortion or abortion advocacy, one of the US president’s first acts in the White House. 
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1 minute video explaining the issue: https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/mar/02/countries-to-join-forces-to-raise-funds--safe-abortions-trump-order-
conference-global-gag-rule 
DW (March 2017) Trump’s planned foreign aid, UN cuts would diminish US influence 
http://www.dw.com/en/trumps-planned-foreign-aid-un-cuts-would-diminish-us-influence/a-
37956234 
President Donald Trump is expected to push for deep cuts in US foreign aid in his initial budget 
proposal, but that could be a hard sell in Congress. More likely is a new focus - and a down-sized 
US role in the UN. 
Schneider, J and West, D.M., How the Trump budget harms global health and weakens 
international stability, TechTank, 27th July 2017, Brookings Institution 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/07/27/how-the-trump-budget-harms-global-health-
and-weakens-international-stability/ 
The President Donald Trump budget calls for a 24 percent reduction in spending on foreign 
assistance for global health. These are the U.S. government funds that support efforts abroad to 
improve disease prevention and treatment. This decrease could spell trouble for the fight against 
neglected diseases and, if enacted, would pose a serious threat to international stability. 
Foreign aid support for global health addresses a wide spectrum of maladies that 
disproportionately affect the world’s poor, usually in developing nations, and receive a dearth of 
funding for research & development (R&D) for new treatments.  Global health expenditures—
whether on prevention, education, vaccination or R&D—represent some of the “best deals in 
philanthropy.”  In fact, as Bill and Melinda Gates state in their foundation’s 2017 annual letter: 
“For every dollar spent on childhood immunizations, you get $44 in economic benefits.” 
Easy to read current blogs on development spending: 
Myers, J (2016) Foreign aid: These countries are the most generous, World Economic 
Forum 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/08/foreign-aid-these-countries-are-the-most-generous/ 
 
Kumar, R (2017) Global Development Trends from Davos, Devex  
https://www.devex.com/news/3-major-global-development-trends-from-davos-89523 
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UK, IDS Blog 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/opinion/why-and-how-the-next-government-should-ensure-an-outward-
looking-uk 
 
Chan, S (2016) Research and evidence for DFID: the role for evidence in new aid strategy, 
IDS Blog 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/opinion/research-and-evidence-for-dfid-the-role-for-evidence-in-new-aid-
strategy 
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